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Abstract
Cloud computing offers an appealing business model and it
is tempting for companies to delegate their IT services to
the cloud. Yet, a company might find it risky to do so for
sensible services and to depend entirely on a single provider,
which can be vulnerable and constitute a clearly identified
target for attackers. We explore in this paper a replication
approach where copies of the same IT service are placed
on several (cumulus) clouds that are not only independent
but actually unaware of each other. Replica consistency is
ensured using CBFT, a new BFT protocol designed for wide
area networks. CBFT uses a primary to handle contention
among multiple client requests but shares the load of multi-
casting and encrypting them among the clients. We evaluate
CBFT on an Emulab cluster with a wide area topology and
convey its scalability with respect to state of the art BFT
protocols.
Keywords Distributed systems, fault-tolerance, cloud com-
puting, Byzantine
1. Introduction
Cloud computing is appealing for its cost effectiveness and
elasticity. In terms of reliability, the cloud might however
not be a panacea. Whenever a cloud server fails, a service
level agreement (SLA) stipulates the proportion of the paid
fee to be returned by the cloud provider. The cheap price
of cloud services, however, might imply that one could not
expect much from the SLA. Amazon EC2 SLA [1] states
for instance that only 10% of the paid bill (excluding one-
time payments made for reserved nodes) will be returned,
for longer than 5 minutes loss of external connectivity, if
[Copyright notice will appear here once ’preprint’ option is removed.]
this occurs more than 50 times in the year 1. The (modest)
financial recompense does not even cover the server unavail-
ability caused by attacks, e.g., denial of service (DoS), nor
by failures in the connecting path between a client node and
the cloud. Preventing DoS attacks, for which Amazon is not
viable, is still an open problem, and reportedly very hard
to handle in practice. Recently a code hosting service ex-
perienced for instance more than 19 hours of downtime af-
ter a distributed DoS attack on the computing infrastructure
rent from Amazon [2]. Moreover, having the computation
located over a wide area network (WAN), and far from the
client, increases the unavailability risks, due, for example, to
an intermediary network device failure.
This state of affairs calls for the good, old replication
technique [3, 4] to obtain dependable services out of cheap,
yet unreliable, components; namely services offered by the
cloud. Assuming the independence of replica failures, a BFT
protocol involving 3f+1 replicas ensures the safe progress
of a service, as long as less than f+1 of the replicas are
faulty [5, 6]. In the extreme case, to promote failure indepen-
dance, the replicas should however be located in geograph-
ically distributed clouds, i.e, what we call cumulus clouds.
Failures that prevent the access to one replica in a given re-
gion would have a small probability to affect replicas in other
regions. For instance, even after a DNS attack or tier-1 router
failure in a given region, the replicas in other regions should
be still reachable.
Nevertheless, a geographical distribution of replicas over
cumulus clouds raises new challenges such as high latency
and communication variance. Current state of the art BFT
protocols [6, 7, 8, 9, 10] are typically designed and op-
timized for short network delays in local area networks
(LAN); and most of them rely on multi-cast (that is not yet
supported in WANs) to enhance performance. Figure 1 de-
picts the performance of PBFT [6], Zyzzyva [7], and Q/U [9]
with 1, 10, and 50 clients in a WAN setting (60 ms delay, 1
1 99.95% annual uptime of 5 minute periods is less than ∼53 times 5
minutes downtime.
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Figure 1. State of the art BFT protocols in a WAN setting.
Mb bandwidth) 2. (We faced implementation problems with
Zyzzyva). The performance of PBFT drops very quickly
when increasing the number of clients. Although Q/U per-
forms much better than other state of the arts BFT protocols,
because of contention between client requests, the latency
quickly increases with the number of clients. In short, the
limited scalability of BFT protocols in a WAN is a major
barrier for adopting a replication approach over multiple
clouds.
Furthermore, most of these BFT protocols involve inter-
replica communication and this hampers failure indepen-
dence. An attacker inside the cloud can obtain the location of
all replicas after compromising or monitoring the traffic on a
single replica. Locating the replicas, an attacker could focus
his attacks on them. With enough resources and motivation,
an attacker can at anytime orchestrate a DoS attack against
a specific node, causing the unavailability of that node. In-
stead, an obfuscated BFT approach, where replicas are un-
aware of each other, and even if they have no idea about the
replication scheme, relies on the client to increase the inde-
pendence of replica failures.
However, replica communication is essential in any state
machine replication protocol. Replicas can interact directly
(as in traditional BFT protocols) or indirectly through a
trustful mediator. The former option is not suitable for an
obfuscation approach. On the contrary, the second option
can have the replicas communicate through a trustful and
secure mediator, i.e., the client. We do assume clients can
fail by crashing but do not behave maliciously.
We argue that this assumption makes sense for appli-
cations where cloud customers are trusted members of the
same organization; e.g., airline ticketing services that pro-
vide access to different agencies. In an airline ticketing sys-
tem, the company hosts its service on a private/public cloud.
It allows access for the ticketing agencies around the globe.
The ticketing agencies access the airline service via their se-
cured and trusted servers, which are viewed as correct clients
by the airline service.
Figure 2 conveys the idea behind our approach: the clouds
are oblivious to the replication procedure, driven by the
2 The experiments are performed in bftsim [11].
Figure 2. Cumulus clouds.
client. An attacker hosted in one of the clouds cannot obtain
the address of other replicas by compromising the replica in-
side that cloud or by monitoring its traffic. In fact, an attacker
will not even know about the replication factor used by the
client. The failure of a replica, hence, remains independent
from the failure of other replicas, since the attacker could not
locate the other replicas after compromising one of them.
This paper is a first step towards putting this approach to
work. We present CBFT, a BFT protocol that offers a high
independence of failures by distributing the replicas over
cumulus clouds. CBFT scales to hundreds of clients due to
two simple design decisions.
1. To handle contention between multiple client requests,
we make use of a primary replica. All requests are first
assigned an order by the primary before getting executed
by the replicas. The requests in all replicas are thus exe-
cuted in the same order regardless of the message arrival
reordering.
2. A high load of client requests on the primary implies a
large number of clients issuing them, which means more
potential processing units. Pushing the load of encrypting
and multi-casting a request from the replicas to the is-
suing clients, therefore, enables the system to efficiently
benefit from the client processing powers.
The load on the primary in CBFT is minimal: it receives
the request from the client and returns the reply. The client
is then responsible for encrypting and sending the request
alongside the assigned order (by the primary) to all other
replicas.
In order to enhance performance, CBFT uses speculation,
which however requires a recovery phase to handle failures.
We address this challenge using the recently proposed notion
of abortability [12]: Replicas in CBFT belong either to the
Active set or to the Passive set. The protocol speculative
phase operates on the Active set. Upon failure detection, the
client eliminates the suspicious replicas from the Active set,
and replaces them with correct ones from the Passive set.
The protocol then resumes progress on the updated Active
set.
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We experimented CBFT on Emulab [13]. On such sys-
tem, CBFT scales to hundreds of clients, and its peak
throughput doubles that of the state of the art Q/U proto-
col, its closest competitor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The back-
ground is recalled in Section 2. Section 3 presents CBFT.
After presenting the evaluation results in Section 4, we dis-
cuss some related work in Section 5, and then we conclude
the paper in Section 6.
2. Background
BFT protocols are replication-based solutions to the prob-
lem of tolerating arbitrary failures of software and hardware
components. A BFT protocol can ensure safety and progress
up to a subset of one third of faulty replicas. Some BFT pro-
tocols requires more replicas. For example, if the application
is replicated on four separate machines, then the BFT proto-
col can tolerate at most one faulty hard disk [5].
2.1 Quorums vs. Agreement-based BFT Protocols
BFT protocols differ in the following characteristics: be-
ing agreement-based or quorum-based, the number of re-
quired phases to commit (communication rounds), response
latency, and throughput. In general, there is a trade-off be-
tween latency and throughput; to have high throughput, the
contention between two competing client requests must be
avoided by using a primary (basically in agreement based
protocols). The primary orders the client requests, and then
forwards them to the other replicas. Although this offers a
high throughput, the commit latency increases because of the
extra phase in communicating with the primary. On the con-
trary, in general, quorum based protocols like Q/U [9] need
no such primary; but they have to deal with the problem of
contending requests.
2.2 Authentication
To tolerate malicious attacks, the messages must be authen-
ticated via some cryptographic techniques, such as Public
Key Cryptography (PKC), which authenticates a single mes-
sage, and Message Authentication Code (MAC), which au-
thenticates a single channel (and its messages). PKC could
make the BFT protocols much simpler since it is verifiable
even after the message is forwarded multiple times, but it is
around 100 times slower than MAC. The throughput can be
bounded by the number of MAC operations per request per-
formed by the bottleneck replica; because the sender has to
authenticate a message for each destination. The node that
sends more messages to the other nodes, therefore, has to do
more MAC operations as well.
2.3 BFT Throughput
For large message sizes, the throughput is bounded by the
input/output bandwidth of the bottleneck replica, i.e., the
replica that sends/receives more messages per request. An
example of such a bottleneck is multi-casting the request by
the primary. The multi-cast cost can be remedied in setups
such as local area network that support hardware multi-cast.
Nevertheless the cloud vendors might be reluctant in offer-
ing the hardware multi-cast support due to its scalability is-
sues [14]. Moreover, to make the replica failures as inde-
pendent as possible, the replicas should be located in geo-
graphically separated clouds, where hardware multi-cast is
not available.
2.4 PBFT
In PBFT [6], the client sends the request to all the replicas
including the primary. The primary determines a sequence
number and forwards the order to other replicas. To detect
the faulty primary, all the replicas broadcast the received
order to ensure that all other replica has received the same
order for the request. Being ensured about the primary, all
the replicas broadcast the ordered request before executing
it. This phase is necessary to detect the interference of two
primaries, which might happen during view change. The
client accepts the replies if they match.
2.5 Zyzzyva
In Zyzzyva [7], the client sends the request only to the pri-
mary. However, after other replicas receive the request as
well as its sequence number from the primary, they imme-
diately execute it and send the reply to the client. The client
accepts the replies if they all match. Otherwise, either the
primary or some of the replicas are faulty. In this case, the
first correct client can detect that and demand changing the
primary.
2.6 Chain
Chain [8] also uses a primary to avoid contention. All other
replicas are ordered in a chain and each one forwards the
request to its successor. The last replica in the chain, i.e.,
the tail, sends the reply back to the client. Although this
technique increases the end-to-end delay, the throughput im-
proves as the number of MAC operations by each replica is
close to one, i.e. the theoretical lower bound. The key idea
is to partition the replicas into two groups, where one group
only verifies the client requests and the other only authenti-
cates the reply. After detecting the failure, the whole proto-
col aborts and the abort history is used to initialize another
instance of BFT protocol.
2.7 Q/U
Quorum-based BFT protocols such as Q/U [9] do not use
a primary and the clients directly communicate with the
replicas. Q/U requires 5f+1 replicas to tolerate f Byzantine
faults. Nevertheless, clients can only contact a preferred
quorum (of size 4f+1) for optimum performance. This could
result in outdated histories in some replicas, which induce
the cost of synchronization phase to the protocol. In this
phase, the outdated replica requests the up-to-date history
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from f+1 other replicas (to ensure that the history is not
manipulated by some faulty replicas).
To tolerate Byzantine clients, Q/U requires the clients to
attach to the request a hash of the latest histories of the repli-
cas. A replica rejects the client request if the hash does not
match with the current history of the replica. In this case, the
replica sends an updated version of the history to the client,
in case it is a correct, but outdated client. If two clients are
accessing the replicas at the same time, neither of them can
complete the commit and the replicas state remain incon-
sistent. This again induces another complex repair phase to
make the histories consistent. In short, the repair phase first
suppresses the replicas from progress. Then, the client that
has noticed the inconsistency, Copy the history prefix that is
confirmed by at least 4f+1 replicas.
Although Q/U has the advantage of optimal communica-
tion rounds in non-contention cases, it becomes very com-
plex as well as expensive in the case of client request con-
tention. As a result, the protocol is not scalable to large num-
ber of clients, where the probability of contention is very
high.
2.8 Abortability
The very notion of abortability [12] was introduced to sim-
plify the complex recovery phases in the design of specula-
tive BFT protocols. An abort-able BFT protocol can abort
at any time upon request; afterwards, no client request will
be serviced by the aborted protocol. A client can initiate
abort if the current running instance of BFT cannot safely
progress anymore (e.g., because of contention or a failure),
or the performance is not satisfactory (because of a change
in the workload or the communication medium). The client
requests can be safely serviced via a new BFT instance. The
new BFT instance is initialized with the last state of the last
BFT instance.
As long as there a client requires a service, the switching
process can be finished by the client. The new instance of
BFT is initialized with an abort history that includes all
the requests globally committed by the replicas in the last
BFT instance. The abort history is calculated based on the
returned commit histories by the replicas. The design of an
abort-able BFT protocol specifies a way to obtain the abort
history, considering that (i) some replicas might be faulty,
and not responding; (ii) some of the responding replicas
might be faulty and return invalid histories; and (iii) the
histories in the replicas could be inconsistent because of
contention or a Byzantine behavior.
Quorum [12] is such an abortable BFT protocol. Similar
to Q/U, Quorum has the minimum latency under no con-
tention. Although abortability has significantly simplified
the design of Quorum, it suffers from the same contention
problem as Q/U. In the case of contention or a Byzantine
behavior, Quorum aborts.
3. Design of CBFT
3.1 Infrastructure
CBFT is designed to be deployed on cloud infrastructures:
Preferably, clouds of distinct providers, different platforms,
and located in geographically distinct locations around the
universe. Server farms like public/private clusters, virtual-
ization systems, or Grids can also be considered. Different
clouds are connected via the Internet, and they are not re-
quired to identify each other. System replicas can be chosen
from distinct cloud vendors seeking high independence.
3.2 Model
Our system model complies with the traditional BFT model
(e.g., PBFT [6]). We assume a message-passing distributed
system using a fully connected network among nodes:
clients and servers. The network may (not infinitely) fail to
deliver, corrupt, delay, or reorder messages. Faulty replicas
and clients may either behave arbitrarily, i.e., in a differ-
ent way to their designed purposes, or they just crash (be-
nign faults). A strong adversary coordinates faulty replicas
to compromise the replicated service. However, we assume
the adversary cannot break cryptographic techniques like
collision-resistant hashes, encryption, and signatures.
Safety properties need to hold in any asynchronous en-
vironment. Clients might fail by crashing, but we don’t as-
sume them to behave maliciously (They are typically part
of the same organization that delegates its IT to the cloud).
Liveness, however, is guaranteed only whenever the sys-
tem is eventually synchronous; i.e., during intervals in which
messages reach their correct destinations within some fixed
worst case delay.
3.3 Algorithm
CBFT is a BFT protocol that minimizes fault dependency
among replicas and exhibits high throughput in WANs. It is
client-based and avoids any inter-replica interaction; repli-
cas communicate through the client instead. The protocol
obtains good performance using speculation: requests are
executed speculatively on replicas. Cryptographic loads and
requests multi-cast are pushed towards clients to reduce
overloads on replicas seeking best performance. CBFT uses
Abortability [12] techniques to recover upon failures.
CBFT, like any optimally resilient BFT protocols, re-
quires 3f+1 replicas to tolerate Byzantine replicas, where
no more than f replicas can be Byzantine. However, using
2f+1 replicas only at a time, it can sustain faults, but cannot
ensure progress. Thus, CBFT launches the speculative phase
on 2f + 1 replicas, and upon failure it recovers by replacing
the faulty replicas with the remaining f . The 2f +1 replicas
are enough to collect correct abort history.
Active/Passive Sets. At any time, the protocol distributes
the replicas over two sets: Active set and Passive set. The
former is composed of 2f + 1 replicas (we call them Active
replicas); these replicas are used in the speculative phase,
4 2010/12/20
Figure 3. Message diagram of CBFT running on three repli-
cas.
speculatively. The other f Passive replicas are used as recov-
ery backups. Particularly, upon failure detection (i.e., in re-
covery phase), the client identifies f Suspicious replicas (that
can include some correct replicas, and other faulty ones), and
replaces them with f replicas from the Passive set. Then, the
new Active set becomes correct again, and the process (the
speculative phase) continues as designed.
Therefore CBFT algorithm consists of two main phases:
a speculative phase, and a recovery phase. The messaging
pattern of speculative phase of CBFT is depicted in Figure 3.
In this section, we present the phases briefly (Details in later
sections).
Speculative Phase. The communication pattern of CBFT
in a failure-free scenario is simple, and it is concerned with
the Active set only (2f + 1 replicas):
1. The client first sends its request to the primary.
2. The primary assigns a sequence number to the request,
executes it, and sends a reply back to the client along
with the assigned sequence number.
3. The client then sends the request together with the as-
signed order (previously done by the primary) to all other
replicas (in Active set).
4. Each non-primary replica executes the received requests
by order, and returns the results to the client.
5. A client accepts a reply only if all replica responses
match; otherwise the recovery phase is launched.
Recovery Phase. This phase takes place using both Pas-
sive and Active sets.
1. When client timer expires waiting for 2f + 1 matching
replies, the client panics and sends a Panic message to all
Active replicas.
2. At this time the client saves a list of f Suspicious replicas
that correspond to the remainder of the first matching
f + 1 replies (possibly a collection of faulty and non-
faulty replicas)
3. Replicas, upon receiving the Panic messages, stop exe-
cuting new requests and send an Abort message back to
client with their signed local histories.
4. Client constructs an Abort history collected from the
matching replies (more details later).
5. Client replaces the Suspicious replicas in the Active set
with the f Passive replicas.
6. The updated Active set becomes correct again, and the
collected abort history is used to initialize the new repli-
cas’ local histories.
3.4 Algorithm Details
We describe here the algorithm. (Because of space limita-
tions, some details and proofs are given in the companion
technical report [15]).
Client Role. To mitigate fault dependencies; CBFT clients
enroll important tasks. First, the client issues the request to-
wards the primary that assigns a unique sequence number.
This is crucial to maintain consistency among different repli-
cas. When the client receives the assigned reply from the
primary, it validates its contents by verifying the MAC. The
client takes the grip again to resend the signed request to the
other 2f Active replicas, however this time, accompanied
with the sequence number. At that instant the client starts a
timer, waiting for replies.
The final decision is also taken by the client. Upon receiv-
ing all replies from all replicas before the timer expires; the
client verifies their MACs and makes sure the replies con-
tents (i.e., the results) are matching. If so, the client consid-
ers the request as complete; otherwise, the client launches
a recovery phase by collecting an abort history, cleaning the
Active set from suspicious replicas, and switching to it again
when updated.
A Light Primary. CBFT pushes multi-cast and MAC
overload towards its clients. In contrast to traditional BFT
protocols, the primary in CBFT has almost the same load as
other replicas. The only additional task is assigning an order
to the requests, which requires very simple computations.
On the other hand, the primary is deprived from any multi-
casting duties that can transform the primary to a bottleneck,
especially that individual MACs should be computed to ev-
ery replica. Instead, multi-cast is done by the client that or-
chestrates communication among replicas as mentioned be-
fore.
Replicas. Excluding the primary, all replicas validate the
client request upon its receipt. They must verify requests
(with MACs, and sequence number) and then try to execute
them. Replicas discard a request rnew in case o(rlast) >
o(rnew); where rnew and rlast are the assigned order of
current request and that of the last executed request in the
replica local history, respectively. Each replica executes the
request rnew if it has already executed all requests rj where
o(rj) < o(rnew). Otherwise, request rnew is en-queued in
a buffer, waiting for the missing requests that fill the gap.
Final replies are authenticated via MACs and are sent by all
replicas directly to the client.
Fault Independence. In spite of the diversity in the infras-
tructure and platforms of different clouds being used at once;
the obfuscation aspects requires replicas to be unknown and
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Figure 4. An example of aborting, where f = 1.
unaware of each other. Replicas usually, need to communi-
cate for two purposes: to ensure a total order (atomic) request
execution, and to validate response correctness (usually done
by the primary). Thus, replicas in CBFT communicate with
each other, however blindly, but guided by a third party me-
diator, the client. As depicted in previous sections, CBFT
makes a unique total ordering possible through the client
(that delivers the sequence number to all replicas), though
replicas cannot directly communicate. The other issue; i.e.,
validating a response, is also performed by the client upon
matching all replica responses. Notice that assuming no ma-
licious clients is essential for this fault independence to hold.
3.5 Recovery Phase
The Recovery phase is composed of three major steps: abort-
ing, collecting abort history, and cleaning Active set from
suspicious replicas.
Aborting. A client in CBFT considers a request as com-
plete if the received 2f + 1 Active replica responses are
matching, before the expiry of the timer. Otherwise, the
client stops sending requests and sends a Panic message to
all replicas. Each replica, upon receiving the Panic message,
stops executing requests, signs an Abort message from its lo-
cal history of committed requests, and sends it to the client.
The latter waits until it receives a sufficient number of signed
Abort messages, i.e., the first f+1 non-conflicting ones. The
intuition is that it is necessary and sufficient for the number
of received correct commit histories to exceed the number of
faulty ones; knowing that faulty replicas might not respond
at all. Aborting is achieved as follows:
1. The client waits for the first f+1 local commit histories
to be received.
2. If no conflicting entries among the f + 1 received local
histories found by the client, it stops receiving new histo-
ries, and collects the f + 1 messages in a ProofAH set.
That is used to form the abort history AH later.
3. Otherwise if the client identified commit histories with
conflicting entries it waits for new local histories (since
definitely there are correct clients that did not respond
yet). The loop continues from step 1 again.
Figure 4 presents an example where the first two histo-
ries returned from replicas R1 and R2 are conflicting, con-
sequently the client has to wait for the history from replica
R3. Thus, the phase continued till f+1 non-conflicting local
commit histories are received by the client.
Building Abort History. A correct abort history is cru-
cial for safety. It preserves total ordering and consistency
across different switching phases. The abort history is col-
lected from the current Active set, to initialize replica local
histories on a new correct Active set. Building the abort his-
tory AH is done by the client after receipt of f + 1 non-
conflicting signed abort messages from different replicas,
collected in the ProofAH structure (as revealed before). The
steps can be summarized as follows:
1. The client generates history h such that AH[j] equals the
value that appears at position j ≥ 1 of f + 1 different
local histories LHj that appear in ProofAH .
2. If such a value does not exist for some position x, then x
is the last index of h.
3. Finally, AH is the longest prefix of h in which no request
appears twice (exclude duplicate entries).
The resulting abort history AH thus includes all the glob-
ally committed client requests as well as some partially com-
mitted ones; for example, if the request is received by at least
f+1 replicas but not all of them. The AH is used to initialize
the new Active replicas’ histories (more details in [15])).
Eliminating Faulty Replicas. A client in CBFT attempts
to replace faulty replicas in the Active set with correct ones
from the Passive set; thus detecting the faulty replicas is
mandatory for progress. As previously explained, upon the
client timer expiry; if no 2f + 1 matching replies were re-
ceived from Active replicas; the client follows a safe pro-
cess to eliminate the faulty replicas by categorizing replies
senders as correct, or suspicious (these might be Byzantine
or not). Since f maximum faulty replicas are assumed, then
f + 1 out of the received messages should correspond to
correct replicas (the matching ones). Therefore the client, to
be on the safe side, considers the remaining Active replicas
suspicious, and replaces them with the f Passive replicas.
The Active set thus comprises 2f+1 correct replicas. The
client initializes them with the abort history AH to restore
system state, and the protocol continues as designed.
3.6 Checkpointing and State Transfer
Since CBFT launches a recovery phase upon fault detection,
and this phase requires executing abort history, then switch-
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ing from Active set to another (it is actually the same Active
set, but cleared out from faulty replicas) will be expensive if
the abort history is large. Consequently, this leads us to min-
imize the local history size. Thus we design a Lightweight
checkpointing system that truncates local histories every k
steps (k can be 128, 256,...).
In addition, since requests are executed on the Active set
only (under normal conditions), then the Passive replicas
will have old state versions, especially systems that are as-
sumed reliable for speculative BFT protocols; in this case the
abort history becomes enormously large. For that, we build
our checkpointing system to keep Passive replicas states up-
to-date (except for the last non-checkpointed offset requests
that are fewer than k). Therefore, the Lightweight check-
pointing protocol proceeds as follows (more details in [15]):
1. The client requires checkpoints from Active replicas pe-
riodically by sending RCHK (for example, when the se-
quence number mod k becomes zero)
2. Each replica i sends its last checkpoint digest CHKi af-
ter truncating k requests (one replica should send com-
plete requests).
3. The client sends the received messages/digests CHK to
the Passive replicas.
4. Passive replicas executes their missing requests found in
CHK, and replies with ACK to the client.
5. When the client receives f ACK messages, it sends a
commitCOM request to all (Active and Passive) replicas
for final commit.
As presented above, the checkpoints are initiated and con-
trolled by the client. This is crucial to respect obfusca-
tion; and here again, replicas are communicating indirectly
through the client.
4. Evaluation
4.1 Overview
CBFT acquires its robustness and performance through vari-
ous characteristics: (1) it needs only 3f+1 replicas to tolerate
f arbitrary faults (though speculative case communication is
done on 2f+1 Active replicas only at a time). (2) It relies on
clients to multi-cast request and not on replicas. (3) It orders
requests using a primary that handles consistency. Finally,
(4) CBFT can be efficiently setup on cumulus clouds, scat-
tered on distant locations and maybe from different vendors,
to ensure higher levels of failure independence.
The closest competitor to CBFT, i.e., Q/U [9], requires
at least 5f+1 to tolerate f Byzantine faults. Additional fees
shall be paid with larger f . Despite the use of preferred
quorums (of size 4f+1), Q/U provides less throughput than
CBFT. This also makes Q/U more susceptible to failures un-
der which its performance drops dramatically. This becomes
lucid when the number of clients increases; partly because
Q/U does not make use of a primary to order request as
CBFT does. In addition, although Q/U is client-based, it en-
forces inter-replica interaction upon failures, which makes
replica failures more dependent. Note that, as mentioned
above, Q/U can overcome this by not using preferred quo-
rums, reducing however its performance further. Regard-
ing fault scalability, Q/U exhibited [9] great performance
over agreement-based protocols; we expect Q/U to dominate
CBFT in this sense, though we did not experiment our pro-
tocol for f > 1.
Quorum [8] also shares some aspects with Q/U; mostly
since it is client-based and involves only two communication
phases. However, Quorum also suffers from interference
under contention; this makes it hard to deploy on reliable
contended services. Note that we faced some difficulties in
experimenting Quorum on our environment because of the
use of multi-cast (especially for large number of clients).
Therefore we do not provide results for Quorum except with
a micro-benchmark.
On the other hand, we do not pretend perfection in CBFT.
The protocol is inherently speculative and outperform oth-
ers only in best cases, i.e., when there are no faults. Under
failure the protocol should abort to another Active set, and
this imposes additional costs represented by switching de-
lays (Section 4.8).
4.2 Experimental Setting
CBFT experiments are performed on 23 64-bit Xeon ma-
chines with 2 GB of memory employed on Emulab [13]
cluster. No virtualization is used, thus simulating cloud en-
vironment on real machines. Each replica runs on a sepa-
rate machine, and the clients are scattered over 20 machines.
All machines are connected using a star topology. The max-
imum bandwidth of the network is set to 100Mb. We set it
to this high value because each machine can host up to 10
clients; and as we will see in the experimental results, the
actual bandwidth that a client can use over a WAN is far be-
low this limit. The end-to-end (E2E) delay is set to 20 ms
and 60 ms, depending on the setup.
For each setting, we have run four a/b benchmark3 (same
benchmark used in PBFT [6]) experiments using different
payload sizes: 0/0, 0/1, 1/0, and 1/1. Without a payload, the
size of request and reply messages are 66 and 88 bytes,
respectively. The fault factor, f , is equal to one, and the
number of replicas is three.
Q/U experiments are also done on the same environment;
except for a single difference where we needed six replicas
(5f+1; for f = 1) instead of three, as this is the number
required by Q/U [9] to operate.
4.3 Benchmark
We present here the results on a benchmark, where only one
client is accessing the replicated service. Figure 5 displays
3 In a/b benchmarks, a and b correspond to request size, and response size
in KB, respectively.
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Figure 5. Commit latency when only one client is used.
the latency results for both CBFT and Q/U by setting the
end-to-end (E2E) latency to 20 ms, and 60 ms. We do not
plot the results for all benchmarks (0/0, 1/0, 0/1, 1/1) as these
are very close; thus we only choose one of them (the one
with minimal latency).
When the E2E latency is set to 20 ms, CBFT achieves a
latency of 80 ms; Q/U on the other hand reaches half this
latency as depicted in Figure 5. We relate this difference to
the number of communication round-trips needed to com-
plete an operation. In fact, CBFT needs a couple of round-
trip messages; one message is sent to the primary to estab-
lish request ordering, and another is sent to communicate
with other replicas and execute the request. Q/U, however,
achieves this latency since it completes the operation in a
single round-trip instead of two.
Again, since Quorum (like Q/U) needs only two commu-
nication phases to commit a request in a speculative way,
they share same performance in a contention-free environ-
ment, the results are shown clearly in Figure 5.
Similar results are obtained upon changing the E2E la-
tency to 60 ms. As shown on the same graph in Figure 5,
the latency of CBFT becomes 240 ms. This was expected
because the large E2E latency becomes the main impacting
factor in the service. The graph also conveys the fact that
Q/U again achieves half this latency. As mentioned above,
this can be demonstrated by the number of round-trip mes-
sages in the protocols.
Analyzing the above numbers, we notice that the latency
can be obtained by the number of round-trips needed for one
request multiplied by the E2E latency. This means that the
system delay is the major factor overhead in the communi-
cation; the operation execution and MAC handling times are
almost negligible as compared to the E2E latency. Notice
that, although Q/U client needs to contact at least 5 repli-
cas (i.e., the preferred quorum [9]), this does not impact the
latency as one might expect, and hence keeps Q/U leading
CBFT in such experiments.
The throughput with the micro-benchmarks again shows
that Q/U outperforms CBFT by almost a double. The through-
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Figure 6. Peak throughput of CBFT vs Q/U for both E2E
latencies: 20 ms, and 60ms.
put of Q/U is 8 op/s when the E2E latency is 60 ms, whereas
the throughput of CBFT is 4 op/s. The ratio is almost the
same in an experiment with 20 ms E2E latency. These
throughput results follow from the above latency difference.
Since there is only one client operating, and the client does
not invoke a new request until it completes the previous one,
the latency will be inversely proportional to the throughput.
We do not plot a graph for the throughput since this has less
importance than latency in contention-free experiments.
4.4 Peak Throughput
To experiment the peak throughput, we used up to 200 con-
current clients. Again since the results are close in different
benchmarks (i.e., 0/0, 1/0, 0/1, 1/1), we mention the results
for only one experiment. The throughput achieved by CBFT
is very interesting and inverts the leadership with Q/U which
it exhibits in contention-free cases. As depicted in Figure 6,
our protocol achieves a peak throughput of 1300 op/s upon
setting the E2E latency to 20 ms.
Q/U, however, could not exceed 570 op/s throughput
when the E2E latency is equal to 20 ms (Figure 6). These
results are justified since; (1) CBFT relies on the primary
to order requests and thus avoids request collisions while
accessing replicas; and (2) it pushes multi-cast and encryp-
tion overhead towards clients. On the contrary, Q/U is not
resilient to a high number of clients and this forces the pro-
tocol to load excessive Repair and Sync phases, and the
client backoff scheme. Note that this throughput is reached
for 80 clients in Q/U, which is the maximum value we could
get in the experiments.
By setting the E2E latency to 60 ms, as expected, the
throughput drops to 520 op/s and 167 op/s in CBFT and Q/U,
respectively. This change is logical since both protocols are
affected by message round-trip delays. However, can be
noticed in Figure 6, the throughput ratio of CBFT over Q/U
changes from 1/2 to 1/3 upon updating the E2E latency
from 20 ms to 60 ms. This might be explained by the extra
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Figure 7. Client scalability of CBFT vs Q/U for both E2E
latencies: 20 ms, and 60ms.
transmissions needed by Q/U because of increasing update
failures.
4.5 Scalability
Yet, in another measure, i.e., client scalability, CBFT domi-
nates Q/U (Figure 7). In the experiments, the results of Q/U
started to fluctuate for more than 40 clients. Then, between
40 and 60 clients at least one run (out of four) was failing.
The protocol ceased to work for a number of clients greater
than 60 or 80, depending on the experiment.
However, CBFT experiments finished successfully even
with 200 simultaneous clients. CBFT can handle this high
number of clients since it avoids requests collisions by hav-
ing a primary replica that only assigns sequence numbers
(a simple operation), and by distributing the load of multi-
casting on clients to avoid replica bottlenecks.
By observing Figure 7, we notice that the CBFT scalabil-
ity is not affected by the E2E latency; however Q/U scales
for 80 clients when E2E latency is 20 ms, and could not tol-
erate more than 60 clients by setting it to 60 ms. This can
be justified by the timeouts caused by Repair phase delays
that Q/U launches more frequently as the number of clients
grows up.
4.6 CBFT3 Observation
To explain the good performance of our client-based ap-
proach for CBFT, we run a comparison with CBFT3, another
version of CBFT that uses 3f + 1 Active replicas instead of
2f + 1. Interestingly, we observed very close performance.
Figure 8 conveys this comparison. For clarity, we only
plot 0/0 benchmark, given that the other benchmark results
are almost the same. The results depict the very facts that
the protocols performances rarely diverge starting from one
client and until 200 clients. This stands as an experimental
support for our claim that CBFT design features (and not the
number of Active replicas) play the main role in achieving
its performance.
 0.06
 0.08
 0.1
 0.12
 0.14
 0.16
 0.18
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200
La
te
nc
y 
(s)
Throughput (op/s)
CBFT
CBFT3
Figure 8. Performance of CBFT vs. CBFT3 for E2E latency
20 ms.
 0.07
 0.08
 0.09
 0.1
 0.11
 0.12
 0.13
 0.14
 0.15
 0.16
 0  200  400  600  800  1000  1200  1400
La
te
nc
y 
(s)
Throughput (op/s)
0/0
0/1
1/0
1/1
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4.7 Performance Traces
Figure 9 presents the evaluation results of CBFT in the
setting where the E2E latency is 20 ms. The x and y axes
represent the throughput and the response time for each run,
respectively. The number of clients varies between 0 and 200
in the runs with 10 clients added per step. As depicted in
the figure, the change in the payload size has a negligible
impact on the performance since the bottleneck is caused
by the network latency and not its bandwidth. The latency
remains 80 ms up to the point where the throughput exceeds
400- 450 op/s. After this point, by increasing the throughput,
the latency also increases up to 30% at a throughput point of
1200 op/s (160 clients). Starting from this point, increasing
the number of clients leads to an exponential increase in the
commit-latency.
Figure 10 conveys the results of the same experiment
when setting the E2E latency to 60 ms. Compared to Figure 9
the performance drops earlier, when the throughput reaches
170 op/s. After this point, the response latency increases
linearly up to 40%, as the number of clients grows.
As already mentioned, the closest competitors to our
protocol are Q/U [9] and Quorum [8]. We performed the
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Figure 11. Response time vs. Throughput of Q/U and
CBFT. The E2E latency is 20ms.
same experiments as CBFT with Quorum. Although we have
shown above the response latency was lower: 40 ms and 120
ms for the settings with an E2E latency of 20 ms and 60 ms,
respectively; however we could not have more results with
more clients because of multi-cast issues in the environment.
Q/U on the other hand, and despite the number of replicas
required (5f+1) to tolerate f faults, dominates our protocol
for a few number of clients; however, CBFT outperforms
Q/U for more clients, where the latter’s latency increases
quickly. Q/U also provided little scalability in the number
of clients as compared to CBFT.
We plot both Q/U and CBFT results (of E2E latency 20
ms) on the same graph in Figure 11. As can be noticed, Q/U
performs differently for benchmarks 1/1 and 1/0 in contrast
with 0/0 and 0/1. Q/U exhibits a constant latency of 40 ms
until reaching a throughput of 80-140 op/s (depends on the
experiment), where, its latency grows to higher than 200 ms
quickly; this is achieved when the number of clients ranges
between 20 and 30.
The other two benchmarks 0/0 and 0/1 in Q/U (also Fig-
ure 11), however, maintain a 40 ms latency until reaching the
400-450 op/s throughput; again where 20 to 30 clients are
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Figure 12. Response time vs. Throughput of Q/U and
CBFT. The E2E latency is 60ms.
Figure 13. CBFT switching cost as a function of abort his-
tory size, and missing requests in local history.
running. This was expected because Q/U needs a single com-
munication phase to commit. Soon, this gets changed signif-
icantly under contention since more phases are needed like
Repair and Sync, in addition to the backoff scheme applied
on contending clients. However, notice on the same graph
that the latency of CBFT remains almost stable (80-100 ms)
even after reaching high throughput levels. Our protocol is
superior to Q/U when the client count advances.
Setting the E2E latency to 60 ms shows very similar re-
sults to what has been conveyed, but of course with different
numbers. Thus, we considered it enough to keep Figure 12
for the reader to analyze without including any comments.
We just note that, we have no explanation to the Q/U apex it
reaches, at the very beginning.
4.8 Switching Cost
As shown above, CBFT achieves a good performance in
free-failure environment. However, under failures, the recov-
ery phase should be launched. The main expensive steps in
this phase are: aborting, collecting abort history, and switch-
ing to a new correct Active set that includes initializing repli-
cas with the new abort history.
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Figure 13 shows the cost of this recovery phase as a
function of an abort history size for f = 1. We assume
that the history size can grow up to 250 requests (of size
1KB). We plot two different curves: one corresponds to
the case when replicas do not miss any request, i.e., all
abort history requests are already executed. The other one
corresponds to the case when one replica misses 30% of
the abort history requests (they are not executed yet); this
replica might represent the Passive set. The figure shows that
the switching cost increases with the history size and that it
is slightly higher in the case when replicas miss requests.
More precisely, the switching cost ranges between 20ms and
30ms as the abort history size varies from 0 to 256. We
consider this cost to be very reasonable, provided that faults
are supposed to be rare in environments that run speculative
protocols’ like CBFT.
5. Related Work
5.1 Obfuscated BFT
CBFT falls into the category of obfuscated BFT protocols,
where replicas do only see the client, thereby increasing the
independence to failures. To the best of our knowledge, Quo-
rum [8] is the only BFT protocol that also belongs to this cat-
egory. However, Quorum can operate with only a few clients,
while CBFT scales to hundreds of clients. Although Q/U [9]
does not have any inter-replica communication in usual sce-
narios, after an inconsistency is caused by contention or a
faulty node, the replicas have to re-synchronize.
5.2 Client-based BFT
One key to the scalability of CBFT is to push the load of
agreement onto the client side. Quorum-based protocols,
such as Q/U and Quorum, benefit from the same design prin-
ciple. However, these notoriously do not scale with the num-
ber of clients. This is mainly because they are vulnerable
to contention between multiple client requests, which makes
the state of the replicas inconsistent. Upon detecting an in-
consistency, the protocol has to call a recovery procedure
to synchronize the replica states. CBFT benefits from a pri-
mary replica to handle contention and is hence scalable to
hundreds of clients. The drawback, however, is the extra la-
tency of communicating with the primary under contention.
5.3 Primary-based BFT
CBFT makes use of a primary replica to avoid contention
between multiple client requests. This has been used in many
BFT protocols such as PBFT [6] and Zyzzyva [7]. The
primary, however, mostly becomes the scalability bottleneck
as it performs more cryptographic operations as well as
message transmissions. In particular, the lack of hardware
multi-cast support in WAN puts a high load on the primary
to multi-cast its messages. To address the scalability issue,
CBFT pushes the multi-cast load on the client side. More
clients issuing the requests implies more processing units
available on the client side, and using these enables the
system to handle a large volume of requests.
5.4 Abortable BFT
Admitting that a single BFT protocol cannot fit all require-
ments, the notion of abortability [8] has recently been pro-
posed to enable switching between BFT protocols whenever
one could perform better, e.g., because of a change in the op-
erating environment. We make use of this abortability notion
to switch between Quorum and Chain, when the load on the
system changes. Furthermore, CBFT leverages abortability
by switching between Active sets: after a failure is detected,
the protocol replaces the suspicious replicas by correct ones
from the Passive set, and uses the updated Active set again.
6. Conclusion
This paper explores an approach where reliable IT services
are built on top of unreliable, yet cost-effective, cumulus
clouds, i.e., geographically distributed clouds. Replicas of
the service, located on the cumulus clouds, are oblivious of
each other, as well as of the replication setting. Distributing
the replicas over a WAN (with a high latency and variance)
raises new challenges in the design of a scalable, high-
throughput BFT protocol.
As a first step putting this approach to work, we intro-
duce CBFT, a BFT protocol that takes up the challenges
of scaling agreement over a WAN. Two simple design de-
cisions are behind CBFT performance. First, we make use
of a primary replica, avoiding contention between multiple
client requests, to assign a sequence number to every request.
Second, we push the load of encrypting and multi-casting a
request from the replicas, which are the bottleneck of agree-
ment, to the issuing clients. Our experimental results shows
that CBFT scales to hundreds of clients in a WAN, while the
throughput of state-of-the-art BFT protocols quickly drops
with the number of clients. CBFT could tolerate both faulty
replicas and clients by using 3f+1 replicas.
With few clients, the latency of CBFT, however, is higher
than that of client-based protocols such as Q/U and Quo-
rum [8, 9]. By applying the notion of abortability [8] in the
design of CBFT, and in contention-free environments, we
can switch to Quorum-like protocols, provided these do not
use multi-cast and achieve low-latency.
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A. Appendix
In this Appendix, we explain CBFT in details. We present
a pseudo-code for the main functions of the protocol de-
scribing the two phases: speculative phase and the recovery
phase; in both client and server sides.
A.1 Notations
We denote the set of all (3f + 1) replicas by Σ. At any time
2f + 1 replicas are in the Active set, and the remaining f
are in the Passive set. In addition, we denote the set of
suspicious replicas (all faulty replicas, and possibly some
correct ones) by Suspicious.
A message m sent by process p to the process q and au-
thenticated with a MAC is denoted by 〈m〉µp,q . In addition,
we denote the digest of the message m by D(m). All pro-
cesses are assumed to own the public key of every other pro-
cess.
Notations for message fields and client/replica local vari-
ables used in CBFT are shown in Figure 14. To help distin-
guish clients requests for the same operation o, we assume
that client c calls Invoke(req, c), where req = 〈o, tc, c〉 and
where tc is a unique, monotonically increasing clients time-
stamp. A replica rj executes req by appending it to LHj .
c - client ID
P - the primary replica
tc - local time-stamp at client c
tj [c] - the highest tc seen by replica j
o - operation invoked by the client
LHj - a local history at replica j
snj - sequence number at replica j
AH - abort history
Figure 14. Message fields and process local variables
A.2 CBFT Pseudo-code
The pseudo-code of the client (c) includes a single method
Invoke(). This method initializes a request, authenticates it
to the primary P , and sends it after adjusting a timer Timer1
(Pseudo 1). When the timer expires and c has not received a
reply from P yet, it launches the Recovery phase. In fact,
some retransmission attempts are invoked before recovery;
however, we do not include this in the pseudo-code for
clarity.
Before recovery, the Suspicious set is formed by call-
ing Identify() function, so that, faulty replicas are ex-
cluded from the Speculative phase. Pseudo 4 conveys
how this takes place. In words, the client looks up for the
first f + 1 matching replies; the corresponding replicas are
considered correct, and the other f replica are noted as
suspicious (though some of them are not, but they have de-
layed responses). The Suspicious set is then passed to the
Recover() method that updates theActive set, and launches
the Speculative phase on the (updated) Active set again.
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Pseudo 1 Invoke(req, c)
1: {Sending to PrimaryP}
2: m ← 〈REQ, req〉µc,P
3: Send(m, P )
4: if Timer1() 6= φ then {UntilTimer1 expires}
5: Receive(rP,snnew , P )∧ V erifiy(rp)
6: if snnew = NULL then
7: {empty sequence #}
8: Recover(P )
9: end if
10: else {Timer1 expiry}
11: Recover(P )
12: end if
13: {Sending to the rest Active replicas}
14: for i ∈ Active \ {P} do {Exclude primary P}
15: {Create messages including sequence snnew}
16: m ← 〈REQ, req, snnew〉µc,i
17: Send(m, i)
18: end for
19: if Timer2() 6= φ then {UntilTimer2 expires}
20: for i ∈ Active \ {P} do
21: Receive(ri, i)∧ V erifiy(ri)
22: end for
23: else {Timer2 expiry}
24: R ← ∪{received rk ∀k ∈ Active}
25: Suspicious ← Identify(R)
26: Recover(Suspicious)
27: end if
28: {Verify if all responses are matching}
29: R ← ∪{rk ∀k ∈ Active}
30: {Cardinality check}
31: if ‖Matching(R)‖ 6= 2f + 1 then
32: {Identify suspicious replicas}
33: Suspicious ← Identify(R)
34: Recover(Suspicious)
35: end if
Pseudo 2 V erify(ri)
1: {Verify response validity}
2: ifMAC(ri) isTrue and ri.tc = req.tc then
3: return True
4: else
5: return False
6: end if
Pseudo 3 Recover(X)
1: Proof ← Panic(req, c)
2: AH ← AbortHistory(Proof)
3: ifX = P then {Primary is faulty}
4: Active← Active \ {P}
5: Mal ← P
6: I ← Passive.pop()
7: P ← I {New Primary}
8: Active← Active ∪ {P}
9: Passive.push(Mal)
10: else {X is a Suspicious list}
11: Active← Active ∪ Passive
12: Active← Active \X
13: Passive← X
14: end if
15: m ← 〈INIT, req, AH, ProofAH〉µc,P
16: RE − INV OKE(m,AH)
Pseudo 4 Identify(X)
1: {ReturnSuspicious set}
2: for i ∈ X and ‖Correct‖ < f + 1 do
3: if ‖ri.reply = rj.reply‖ ≥ f+1;∀rj ∈ X
then
4: Correct← Correct ∪ {i}
5: end if
6: end for
7: Suspicious ← Active \ Correct
8: return Suspicious
Pseudo 5 AbortHistory(Proof)
1: {Build abort history}
2: h←{anyLH ∈ Proof}
3: for all i : 1 → h.size() do
4: for allLH ∈ Proof do
5: if ‖h[i] = LH[i]‖ ≥ f + 1 then
6: H[i] ← h[i]
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: {Remove duplicates}
11: for all i : 1 → H.size() do
12: for all j : i→ H.size() do
13: ifH[i] 6= H[j] then
14: AH ← H[i]
15: else
16: return AH
17: end if
18: end for
19: end for
20: return AH
Pseudo 6 Panic(req, c)
1: {Send PANIC to all Active replicas}
2: for i ∈ Active do
3: m ← 〈PANIC, req〉µc,i
4: Send(m, i)
5: end for
6: while ‖Proof‖ < f + 1 and i ∈ Active do {Until
collecting f + 1 matchingLH}
7: R← Receive(ri, i)∧ V erifiy(ri)
8: if ri.type = ABORT then
9: for all j ∈ R do
10: for all k ∈ R do
11: if ‖rj.LH = rk.LH‖ ≥ f + 1
then
12: Proof ← Proof ∪{rj.LH}
13: end if
14: end for
15: end for
16: end if
17: end while
18: return Proof
Pseudo 7 Server(id)
1: while True do
2: Receive(mc, c)
3: Handle(mc, id)
4: end while
Pseudo 8 Matching(X)
1: {Check if replies match}
2: for i ∈ X do
3: if ri.reply = rj.reply and ri.D(LHi) =
rj.D(LHj) ∀rj ∈ X then
4: M ← M ∪ {ri}
5: end if
6: end for
7: if ‖M‖ = 2f + 1 then
8: return True
9: else
10: return False
11: end if
Pseudo 9 Handle(mc, i)
1: {Handling client request}
2: ifMAC(mc) is False ormc.tc ≤ ti[c] then
3: return False
4: {request is not valid}
5: end if
6: ifm.type = REQ then {Request message}
7: if i = P then {if Primary}
8: sni ← sni + 1
9: Exec(mc) {execute request, append toLH}
10: r ← 〈REP, rep,D(LHi), sni〉µi,c
11: Send(r, c)
12: else {not a Primary}
13: ifmc.sn = sni + 1 then
14: sni ← mc.sn
15: Exec(mc) {execute request, append toLH}
16: r ← 〈REP,D(rep)〉µi,c
17: Send(r, c)
18: end if
19: end if
20: else ifm.type = PANIC then {Panic message}
21: r ← 〈ABORT,mc.tc,D(LHi)〉µi,c
22: Send(r, c)
23: else ifm.type = INIT then {Init message}
24: ifLHi = φ then {Empty local history}
25: LHi ← AH
26: end if
27: Exec(mc)
28: r ← 〈REP,D(LHi)〉µi,c
29: Send(r, c)
30: end if
31: return True
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Then, after collecting the local histories in Proof . The
client builds the abort historyAH by callingAbortHitory()
method (Pseudo 5). AH represents the matching entries of
all the f + 1 local histories in Proof (duplicates are also
removed). Note that, some entries of the local history will
not be included inAH . Actually, since these are not included
in all the local histories, then some clients have definitely not
completed the corresponding requests, and they will simply,
re-invoke them again.
The recovery phase is launched by the client upon invok-
ing Recover() method (Pseudo 3). The client starts by call-
ing the panic() method; thus, it sends a PANIC message
to all Active replicas. As depicted in Pseudo 6, the client
waits for the first f + 1 ABORT messages. Then, it checks
whether the replies are non-conflicting; if they are, it waits
for further replies to be received. However, when f + 1 of
the received replies match, the client stores them (as well as
the local histories LH) in a Proof set (Pseudo 6; lines: 11
and 12). Proof is used later to build the abort history AH .
Since a maximum of f replicas can be Byzantine, the client
must eventually receive f + 1 correct replies. In addition,
PANIC messages are retransmitted if the network delays
are longer than expected; however, we strongly assume that
this should not happen in the environments that are supposed
to run speculative protocols like CBFT.
On the contrary, when c receives a reply from the primary
P , it verifies its MAC and the corresponding time-stamp
(Pseudo 2). The client then, prepares to send the request req
to the remaining replicas in the Active set (Active \ P );
however this time, it appends the sequence number snP (al-
ready assigned by P ) to req, and signs it with the MACs
of the Active \ P replicas. The client (c) then waits for 2f
replies to be received from the replicas (thus the total count
becomes 2f + 1). Again, if the timer Timer2 expired be-
fore receiving the supposed replies, recovery will be invoked
(some retransmissions have been removed for clarity). Oth-
erwise, c checks if all replies are matching (Pseudo 8) to
complete the request; if they are not, the client recovers after
collecting suspicious replicas.
Finally, the client in Pseudo 3 removes the Suspicious
replicas from the Active set and replaces them with the
Passive ones. Therefore, the active set becomes correct
again, and ready to enter the Speculative phase by invoking
the request (after initializing the local histories of the new
replicas). Note that, the special case of faulty primary is
treated in a bit different way than other replicas. In fact, if the
client has not received a reply from P before Timer1 expiry,
P is simply replaced by another replica from the Passive
set (i.e., no need to replace f replicas).
The pseudo-code of the server side is simple in CBFT.
It is represented by receiving requests from clients and han-
dling them (Pseudo 7). Handling requests of various types
occurs differently: REQ messages are ordinary requests; af-
ter validating their MACs, and checking out the validity of
their time-stamps, the request is executed (i.e, appended to
LH). If the replica is a primary, it increments its sequence
number snP and appends it to the reply. The non-primary
replicas, however, need to make sure that the received re-
quest is not already executed (Pseudo 9; lines 13 and 14).
In addition, if some requests sni with sni < snnew are not
executed yet, the replicas buffer the new request until the
missing (actually delayed) requests arrive (We do not con-
vey buffering in the pseudo-code for simplicity).
Replicas handle PANIC requests by ceasing to exe-
cute further requests, and then sending ABORT replies that
comprises their local history digests D(LH) (Pseudo 7). On
the other hand, INIT requests are used by replicas to exe-
cute any missing requests in their local histories after recov-
ery.
B. Correctness
B.1 Commit Certificate
Proposition. Any completed request by the client has been
committed by the Active replicas.
Proof. The client in CBFT completes a request only if it
has received 2f + 1 matching responses including the local
history digests D(LHi) of the Active replicas (Pseudo 9,
line 31), among which f + 1 replicas are correct. Recall
that, local histories (LHi) are uniquely defined sequences
of requests, which represent the replica state at any time.
Then, since a correct replica appends the new request (upon
execution) to its local history before sending the LH digest
(Exec method in Pseudo 9), then these digests represent an
indication for the client certifying that its request has been
committed successfully.
B.2 Validity
Proposition. Any request that is found in the commit/abort
history must have been sent by some client.
Proof. A client commits a request only if all the received
commit histories (LH) of the Active replicas are matching
(Pseudo 1, line 31). Thus, at least f+1 correct replicas must
have executed the request, and appended it to LH . On the
other hand, a replica executes (i.e., appends to LH) a request
message REQ (or INIT message) only after validating
its sender identity; that should be some client. In addition,
to avoid duplicates in LH , a replica always maintains and
checks the last client time-stamp ti[c] (Pseudo 9, line 2).
As for the abort history AH , since it is collected from
f + 1 matching LH (Pseudo 5); thus, all requests in the
AH are sent by some client (follows from the previous
paragraph). As for AH duplicates, they are removed by
construction (Pseudo 5, lines: 10 to 15).
B.3 Termination
Proposition. Aborting from the Specultive phase eventu-
ally occurs.
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Proof. CBFT runs the Speculative phase until: (1) the
client detects non matching responses from replicas or (2)
its timer expires. In both cases, the client should abort the
Speculative phase by sending a PANIC messages to all the
Active replicas (for progress, it keeps sending such mes-
sages until receiving the needed ABORT messages). The
replicas should eventually receive the PANIC messages
(according to our assumption that sent messages are not in-
finitely delayed or dropped by the network). Thus, at least
f + 1 correct replicas should send ABORT messages to
the client (Pseudo 6, line 11). When the client (eventually)
receives f + 1 matching ABORT messages, it aborts the
request (since the clients can not be malicious).
B.4 Lemma 1
Denote the state of the local history of replica ri upon ap-
pending request req to LHi by LHreqi . Then, for any mes-
sagem sent by ri upon appending to LHi with history LHmi
, LH
req
i is a prefix of LHmi . In other words, LH
req
i remains
a prefix of LHi forever.
Proof. Let the current state LHi of some replica ri be
LH
req
i . A correct replica ri modifies its local history LHi
by sequentially appending any new request m to LHi; in
particular, appending to its prefix LHreqi (Exec function in
Pseudo 9). Hence, ∀ new request m, LHreqi remains a prefix
of LHmi forever.
B.5 Commit Ordering
Proposition. Commit histories can not contain requests in
conflicting orders.
Proof. Assume, by contradiction, that there are two com-
mitted requests req and req′ 6= req (sent by two clients c
and c′, respectively) with different commit histories hreq and
hreq′ , such that, neither is the prefix of the other. Since a cor-
rect client commits a request only when it receives 2f + 1
identical LH digests from replicas (Pseudo 1; line 31); then,
there must be a correct replica rj that sent D(hreq) to c and
D(hreq′) to c′ such that hreq is not a prefix of hreq′ nor vice
versa. A contradiction with Lemma 1.
B.6 Abort Ordering
Proposition. For any committed request req, every commit
history hreq is a prefix of any abort history AH .
Proof. Considering a single replica ri; suppose that ∃ a
request req and ABORT message m such that hreq is not
a prefix of LHmi . Since req is already committed, then it
must be included in 2f + 1 local histories from the Active
replicas including ri (Pseudo 1; line 31). But ri does not
send ABORT messages unless after it stops executing new
requests; thus ri executed req before m. Hence, by Lemma
1, hreq is a prefix of LHmi . On the other hand, since an abort
history is constructed from f + 1 matching LH digests sent
by correct replicas (Pseudo 5), then hreq must be a prefix to
all these LH , i.e., to the abort history AH .
B.7 Init Ordering
Proposition. INIT history is a prefix for any commit/abort
history.
Proof. Every correct process must initialize its local his-
tory with some valid Init history before sending any mes-
sage (Pseudo 9, line 23). Since any common prefixCP of all
valid Init histories is a prefix of every single Init history I ,
thus CP is a prefix for every local history sent by a correct
replica. Init ordering for commit histories immediately fol-
lows.
In the case of abort histories; f + 1 correct ABORT
messages are received by a client upon aborting a request.
The ABORT message contains the replicas LH (Pseudo 9,
line 21) that have CP as a prefix. Thus, CP is a prefix of
any abort history AH .
B.8 Progress
Proposition. Clients eventually receive replies to their re-
quests.
Proof. Recall: we assume that the network can not de-
lay messages infinitely. Thus, we suppose any sent mes-
sages to reach its destination within a maximum delay δ. In
the Speculative phase of CBFT, clients wait for responses
from replicas twice: (1) waiting for the primary (Timer1,
Pseudo 1, line 4), and then (2) waiting for the other Active
replicas (Timer2, Pseudo 1, line 23). Adjusting Timer1 and
Timer2 for a duration of 2δ+t (i.e, the delay for a complete
request round trip + the expected execution time at replicas)
ensures that the client will eventually receive 2f + 1 replies
from the Active replicas.
In the Recovery phase, the client also waits for f + 1
non-conflicting ABORT messages from replicas to switch
(Pseudo 6). This must occur since at least f + 1 Active
replicas must be correct. A timer in this case can be adjusted
to 2δ + t also to ensure progress. This represents the time
for the PANIC messages to reach the replicas + handling
time at replicas + the delay of ABORT messages from
the replicas to the client (however this is not shown in the
pseudo-code). Upon the expiry of the timer , retransmission
of PANIC messages is invoked again.
Regarding the detection and replacement of Suspicious
replicas, some progress issues might appear if the faulty
replicas are distributed among both Active and Passive
sets. Section C addresses this issue, and provides a switching
optimization to ensure liveness.
C. Switching Optimization
The concept of switching from one Active set to another
is possible by the replacement of f Suspicious replicas
with other f Passive ones (Pseudo 4). These Suspicious
replicas can be faulty or just slow; thus, it is worth replac-
ing them with new correct/fast replicas. This is suitable for
small f (for instance, f = 1). However, when f is large, and
the faulty replicas are distributed among the Passive and
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Active sets; liveness problems might show up, since faulty
replicas can force continuous switching. A slight optimiza-
tion for switching solves this issue with paying a very lit-
tle cost: Instead of electing the first f + 1 matching replies
to distinguish the Suspicious replicas, we give way to the
client to contact the 3f + 1 replicas in order to choose the
Suspicious set.
In particular, after the client receives the ABORT mes-
sages from f + 1 replicas, it sends the INIT request to all
(3f + 1) replicas instead of the Active ones only. The first
2f+1 received matching replies correspond to correct repli-
cas, that are designated as Active replicas by the client. The
remaining f replicas form the Passive set. Starting from
that instant, the client sends itsREQmessages to theActive
replicas as usual. By this optimization; choosing the Active
replicas is always done by consulting all replicas at once, and
thus, obtaining a possibly different Active set upon distinct
Recovery phases to maintain progress.
D. Lightweight Checkpointing
The objective of Lightweight checkpointing is to maintain
small size local histories LH on replicas in order to reduce
the communication cost, in particular, upon moving from
the Speculative phase to the Recovery phase. Lightweight
checkpointing can minimize the local history sizes (256 for
instance); and thus reducing the switching time. Figure 13
conveys the switching time as a function of abort history
size. Checkpointing appears more crucial as Passive repli-
cas have to be updated continuously, so that, they maintain
an up-to-date state as Active replicas.
Lightweight checkpointing pseudo-code is presented in
Pseudo 10 and Pseudo 11. The client triggers checkpointing
every k requests (we use k = 256). It sends RCHK message
toActive replicas (Pseudo 10, lines: 1 to 5) and starts a timer
Timer1. Each Active replica validates the RCHK (MAC
and times-tamp), and sends a CHK message to the client.
A CHKi message sent by replica i contains: the digest of
256 requests starting from its last checkpoint of number ni,
and the new supposed checkpoint counter ni+1 (Pseudo 11,
lines: 10 and 13). The primary P is an exception; it sends
the CHK messages with the whole LHP (not a digest;
Pseudo 11, line 8).
When the client receives 2f + 1 CHK messages with
valid MACs and matching digests, it sends aRCHK message
to the Passive replicas with the LHc piggybacked (LHc
is equivalent to LH of the primary). Otherwise, if Timer1
expired, the checkpoint is postponed to the next attempt.
After validating the request, a Passive replica appendsLHc
to its local history (Pseudo 11, line 12), and replies to the
client with a CHK message. When the client receives f
such messages from the Passive replicas, it sends COM
message to all replicas (Active and Passive) to commit the
checkpoint (Pseudo 10, lines: 28 to 30). The replicas, then,
truncate the 256 requests from their LH and increment their
checkpoint counter ni (Pseudo 11, lines: 17 and 18).
As we notice, a checkpoint does not succeed unless all
the replicas responded correctly. Thus, if a checkpoint failed,
replicas should truncate 2×256 requests instead of 256 in the
next attempt. More generally, i× 256 requests are truncated
if i consecutive failed attempts occurred.
Pseudo 10 CHKclient()
1: {SendRCHK to allActive replicas}
2: for i ∈ Active do
3: m ← 〈RCHK〉µc,i
4: Send(m, i)
5: end for
6: ifTimer2() 6= φ then {Until Timer1 expires}
7: while ‖ProofCHK‖ < 2f + 1 and i ∈ Active do {Until collecting 2f + 1 matching
CHK}
8: Receive(ri, i)∧ V erifiy(ri)
9: if ri.LH = j.LH and ri.ni = rj.nj ; ∀j ∈ R1 then
10: R1 ← R1 ∪ {ri}
11: end if
12: end while
13: end if
14: {SendRCHK to allPassive replicas}
15: for i ∈ Passive do
16: m ← 〈RCHK,LHc〉µc,i
17: Send(m, i)
18: end for
19: ifTimer2() 6= φ then {Until Timer2 expires}
20: while ‖ProofCHK‖ < f + 1 and i ∈ Passive do {Until collecting f matching ACK
CHK}
21: Receive(ri, i)∧ V erifiy(ri)
22: if ri.LH = rj.LH and ri.ni = rj.nj ; ∀j ∈ R1 ∪ R2 then
23: R2 ← R2 ∪ {ri}
24: end if
25: end while
26: end if
27: {Commit checkpointnc}
28: for i ∈ Passive ∪ Active do
29: m ← 〈COM,ni〉µc,i
30: Send(m, i)
31: end for
Pseudo 11 CHKreplica(mc)
1: {Handling checkpoint requests}
2: ifMAC(mc) isFalse ormc.tc ≤ ti[c] then
3: return False
4: {request is not valid}
5: end if
6: ifm.type = RCHK then {RCHK message}
7: if i = P then {if Primary}
8: r ← 〈CHK,LHi, ni + 1〉µc,i
9: else if i ∈ Active then {Send digest only}
10: r ← 〈CHK,D(LHi), ni + 1〉µc,i
11: else {Passive replicas update theirLH}
12: LHi ← mc.LHc
13: r ← 〈CHK,D(LHi), ni + 1〉µc,i
14: end if
15: Send(r, c)
16: else ifm.type = COM then {Commit request}
17: ni ← ni + 1
18: Truncate(LHi, ni) {truncate 128LH entries}
19: end if
20: return True
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